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the instinctive propensity to devour the young at birth, if not prevented by the success of the female in hiding herself at that time. Provided they escape, however, the male usually becomes the protector of the brood very shortly thereafter. This rule holds good of all carnivorous species save the bear, which is also the least fertile ; and it also holds good of all prolific herbivorous species. When the range of one or more pairs in a state of nature is for any reason extended, and the food supply thereby increased, the female for that very reason has a greater opportunity of concealment when about to bring forth, and the feral population increases until this is no longer true, when the majority of the young will again inevitably be devoured at birth. Similar checks operate in the case of raptorial birds and of fish, and Mr. Paulin believes that on further investigation they might be discovered for all portions of animate nature. This may be described as a process of selection ; but it is one which operates without regard to individual differences, only on immature individuals, and which results in a survival of the average. — This conclusion is not new, but Mr. Paulin's argument for it is.

The second part of the book is devoted to a discussion of the so-called Malthusian law of population, which Mr. Paulin attacks as both false and immoral. In its stead he proposes the principle that "the general movement of population is determined directly by the ability of the individuals of a community to marry ; and this ability again depends upon the state of the labor market. When the labor market is expanding from year to year, more people are enabled to marry," and the birthrate rises. This conclusion he supports by statistics of marriages, births, deaths, average life-terms, and immigration, compared by decades, for most of the countries of Europe ; and altogether he seems more at home in this part of his subject than earlier.

The book is suggestive, in spite of its great deficiencies, and the singular ignorance it shows of what has been done during the last fifty years in the subjects with which it deals.

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The Grammar of Philosophy. A Study of Scientific Method. By DAVID GRAHAM. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1908. — pp. xi, 383.

Not only is the title of this book misleading — for it gives no analysis of scientific method, and is merely a defense of the attitude of 'common sense' in philosophy — but there is so little argument in it, and so much abuse, that the philosophical student will hardly care to spend much time with it. We give a few quotations that seem to us typical : "not even Bishop Berkeley himself ever really believed that a thunderstorm, say, was a mere disturbance within the region of his own episcopal ego !" (p. 26). Of Newman's mysticism we read, "Every man opposed to intelligence [!] belongs to the gibbering Brotherhood of Futilitarians" (p. 32). Hume's reasonings are described as "perpetual stultiloquy" (p. 83), and Hegel's Philosophy of Religion "seems to be a prolonged Hum-m-m-m" (p. 205, footnote).

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Identité et réalité. Par E. MEYERSON. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908. — pp. vii, 432.

In what does a scientific explanation of a given phenomenon consist? — this is the question with which M. Meyerson's study of the philosophy of science, or epistemology, is introduced. The historical answers to the question may be arranged in two classes: the first, represented, *e. g.*, by Comte and Helmholtz, reduces causality to mere law of sequence and maintains that any fact is adequately explained by subsumption under the general law; the second, as illustrated, *e. g.*, by Lucretius and Leibniz, makes the principle of causality fundamental, without which there could be no empirical laws. The two principles thus distinguished are that of "legality" — so to translate the "*Gesetzlichkeit*" of Helmholtz — and that of "scientific causality," the denotation of the two concepts being apparently coterminous with descriptive and purely empirical science on the one hand, and explicative and theoretical science on the other.

"It is not true that the sole end of science is action, nor that it is dominated by the desire of economy in that action. Science also aims to make us *understand* nature" (p. 353). The principle of causality, "causa aequat effectum," which is essentially one of permanence throughout the temporal series, is assumed continually in the thought of science, as well as of common sense, and its supposition is an inherent "tendance d'esprit humaine." Descriptive laws, however, while they are adequate to economy of action, do not give intellectual satisfaction. A notable historical example of this further demand of the intelligence is found in Newton, who, having formulated the laws of gravitating masses, still felt that he had not *explained* gravitation. The chapter on "Mechanism" presents the great historical attempts at explicative hypotheses, and the following chapters, "Principle of Inertia," "Conservation of Matter," and "Conservation of Energy," show the important rôle played by the conviction of identity in time in certain regions of science. But any mechanical hypothesis has two irrational limits: one, on the side of the subject, in that it cannot explain the facts of consciousness, and the other, on the side of the object, in that it has to leave unexplained the interaction of the ultimate quantities with which it deals. Under the caption of "Non-mechanical Theories," the author discusses the views of Aristotle and Ostwald, among others, while still sustaining the thesis, "L'identité est le cadre éternel de notre esprit" (p. 260). The chapter preceding the general "Conclusion," makes an analysis, more detailed than in previous portions of the work, of the concepts of common sense. The process by which the concepts of this lower stage